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Abstract
Recent advances in Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) have shown increasing success in generating pho-
torealistic images. But they also raise challenges to vi-
sual forensics and model attribution. We present the first
study of learning GAN fingerprints towards image attribu-
tion and using them to classify an image as real or GAN-
generated. For GAN-generated images, we further identify
their sources. Our experiments show that (1) GANs carry
distinct model fingerprints and leave stable fingerprints in
their generated images, which support image attribution;
(2) even minor differences in GAN training can result in
different fingerprints, which enables fine-grained model au-
thentication; (3) fingerprints persist across different image
frequencies and patches and are not biased by GAN arti-
facts; (4) fingerprint finetuning is effective in immunizing
against five types of adversarial image perturbations; and
(5) comparisons also show our learned fingerprints consis-
tently outperform several baselines in a variety of setups 1.
1. Introduction
In the last two decades, photorealistic image generation
and manipulation techniques have rapidly evolved. Visual
contents can now be easily created and edited without leav-
ing obvious perceptual traces [72]. Recent breakthroughs
in generative adversarial networks (GANs) [31, 52, 10, 32,
38, 19] have further improved the quality and photoreal-
ism of generated images. The adversarial framework of
GANs can also be used in conditional scenarios for im-
age translation [36, 70, 71] or manipulation in a given con-
text [60, 61, 57, 12, 64], which diversifies media synthesis.
1Code, data, models, and supplementary material are available at
GitHub.
Figure 1. A t-SNE [43] visual comparison between our fingerprint
features (right) and the baseline inception features [52] (left) for
image attribution. Inception features are highly entangled, indi-
cating the challenge to differentiate high-quality GAN-generated
images from real ones. However, our result shows any single dif-
ference in GAN architectures, training sets, or even initialization
seeds can result in distinct fingerprint features for effective attri-
bution.
At the same time, however, the success of GANs has
raised two challenges to the vision community: visual
forensics and intellectual property protection.
GAN challenges to visual forensics. There is a
widespread concern about the impact of this technology
when used maliciously. This issue has also received in-
creasing public attention, in terms of disruptive conse-
quences to visual security, laws, politics, and society in gen-
eral [6, 1, 3]. Therefore, it is critical to look into effective
visual forensics against threats from GANs.
While recent state-of-the-art visual forensics techniques
demonstrate impressive results for detecting fake visual me-
dia [16, 53, 27, 13, 22, 11, 35, 67, 68, 26], they have
only focused on semantic, physical, or statistical incon-
sistency of specific forgery scenarios, e.g., copy-move
manipulations[16, 26] or face swapping [67]. Forensics on
GAN-generated images [44, 47, 59] shows good accuracy,
but each method operates on only one GAN architecture by
identifying its unique artifacts and results deteriorate when
the GAN architecture is changed. It is still an open question
of whether GANs leave stable marks that are commonly
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shared by their generated images. That motivates us to in-
vestigate an effective feature representation that differenti-
ates GAN-generated images from real ones.
GAN challenges to intellectual property protection.
Similar to other successful applications of deep learning
technology to image recognition [33] or natural language
processing [30], building a product based on GANs is non-
trivial [37, 4, 5]. It requires a large amount of training data,
powerful computing resources, significant machine learning
expertise, and numerous trial-and-error iterations for iden-
tifying optimal model architectures and their model hyper-
parameters. As GAN services become widely deployed
with commercial potential, they will become increasingly
vulnerable to pirates. Such copyright plagiarism may jeop-
ardize the intellectual property of model owners and take
future market share from them. Therefore, methods for at-
tributing GAN-generated image origins are highly desirable
for protecting intellectual property.
Given the level of realism that GAN techniques already
achieve today, attribution by human inspection is no longer
feasible (see the mixture of Figure 4). The state-of-the-
art digital identification techniques can be separated into
two categories: digital watermarking and digital fingerprint
detection. Neither of them is applicable to GAN attri-
bution. Previous work on watermarking deep neural net-
works [65, 62] depends on an embedded security scheme
during “white-box” model training, requires control of the
input, and is impractical when only GAN-generated images
are accessible in a “black-box” scenario. Previous work on
digital fingerprints is limited to device fingerprints [42, 21]
or in-camera post-processing fingerprints [24], which can-
not be easily adapted to GAN-generated images. That mo-
tivates us to investigate GAN fingerprints that attribute dif-
ferent GAN-generated images to their sources.
We present the first study addressing the two GAN chal-
lenges simultaneously by learning GAN fingerprints for im-
age attribution: We introduce GAN fingerprints and use
them to classify an image as real or GAN-generated. For
GAN-generated images, we further identify their sources.
We approach this by training a neural network classifier and
predicting the source of an image. Our experiments show
that GANs carry distinct model fingerprints and leave stable
fingerprints in their generated images, which support image
attribution.
We summarize our contributions as demonstrating the
existence, uniqueness, persistence, immunizability, and vi-
sualization of GAN fingerprints. We address the following
questions:
Existence and uniqueness: Which GAN parameters dif-
ferentiate image attribution? We present experiments
on GAN parameters including architecture, training data, as
well as random initialization seed. We find that a difference
in any one of these parameters results in a unique GAN fin-
gerprint for image attribution. See Figure 1, Section 3.1 and
4.2.
Persistence: Which image components contain finger-
prints for attribution? We investigate image compo-
nents in different frequency bands and in different patch
sizes. In order to eliminate possible bias from GAN arti-
fact components, we apply a perceptual similarity metric
to distill an artifact-free subset for attribution evaluation.
We find that GAN fingerprints are persistent across differ-
ent frequencies and patch sizes, and are not dominated by
artifacts. See Section 3.2 and 4.3.
Immunizability: How robust is attribution to image per-
turbation attacks and how effective are the defenses?
We investigate common attacks that aim at destroying im-
age fingerprints. They include noise, blur, cropping, JPEG
compression, relighting, and random combinations of them.
We also defend against such attacks by finetuning our attri-
bution classifier. See Section 4.4.
Visualization: How to expose GAN fingerprints? We
propose an alternative classifier variant to explicitly visual-
ize GAN fingerprints in the image domain, so as to better
interpret the effectiveness of attribution. See Section 3.3
and 4.5.
Comparison to baselines. In terms of attribution accu-
racy, our method consistently outperforms three baseline
methods (including a very recent one [45]) on two datasets
under a variety of experimental conditions. In terms of
feature representation, our fingerprints show superior dis-
tinguishability across image sources compared to inception
features [52].
2. Related work
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). GANs [31,
52, 10, 32, 38, 19] have shown improved photorealism in
image synthesis [40, 15, 69], translation [36, 70, 71], or ma-
nipulation [9, 60, 61]. We focus on unconditional GANs as
the subject of our study. We choose the following four GAN
models as representative candidates of the current state of
the art: ProGAN [38], SNGAN [46], CramerGAN [14],
and MMDGAN [17], considering their outstanding perfor-
mances on face generation.
Visual forensics. Visual forensics targets detecting statis-
tical or physics-based artifacts and then recognizing the au-
thenticity of visual media without evidence from an em-
bedded security mechanism [28, 27]. An example is a
steganalysis-based method [29], which uses hand-crafted
features plus a linear Support Vector Machine to detect forg-
eries. Recent CNN-based methods [13, 22, 18, 11, 35, 67,
68, 7, 23, 26] learn deep features and further improve tam-
pering detection performance on images or videos. Ro¨ssler
et al. [49, 50] introduced a large-scale face manipulation
dataset to benchmark forensics classification and segmenta-
tion tasks, and demonstrated superior performance when us-
ing additional domain-specific knowledge. For forensics on
GAN-generated images, several existing works [44, 47, 59]
show good accuracy. However, each method considers only
one GAN architecture and results do not generalize across
architectures.
Digital fingerprints. Prior digital fingerprint techniques
focus on detecting hand-crafted features for either device
fingerprints or postprocessing fingerprints. The device fin-
gerprints rely on the fact that individual devices, due to
manufacturing imperfections, leave a unique and stable
mark on each acquired image, i.e., the photo-response non-
uniformity (PRNU) pattern [42, 21]. Likewise, postpro-
cessing fingerprints come from the specific in-camera post-
processing suite (demosaicking, compression, etc.) during
each image acquisition procedure [24]. Recently, Marra et
al. [45] visualize GAN fingerprints based on PRNU, and
show their application to GAN source identification. We
replace their hand-crafted fingerprint formulation with a
learning-based one, decoupling model fingerprint from im-
age fingerprint, and show superior performances in a variety
of experimental conditions.
Digital watermarking. Digital watermarking is a com-
plementary forensics technique for image authentica-
tion [58, 39, 51]. It involves embedding artificial water-
marks in images. It can be used to reveal image source
and ownership so as to protect their copyright. It has been
shown that neural networks can also be actively water-
marked during training [65, 62]. In such models, a char-
acteristic pattern can be built into the learned representation
but with a trade-off between watermarking accuracy and the
original performance. However, such watermarking has not
been studied for GANs. In contrast, we utilize inherent fin-
gerprints for image attribution without any extra embedding
burden or quality deterioration.
3. Fingerprint learning for image attribution
Inspired by the prior works on digital fingerprints [42,
24], we introduce the concepts of GAN model fingerprint
and image fingerprint. Both are simultaneously learned
from an image attribution task.
Model fingerprint. Each GAN model is characterized by
many parameters: training dataset distribution, network ar-
chitecture, loss design, optimization strategy, and hyper-
parameter settings. Because of the non-convexity of the
objective function and the instability of adversarial equilib-
rium between the generator and discriminator in GANs, the
values of model weights are sensitive to their random initial-
izations and do not converge to the same values during each
training. This indicates that even though two well-trained
GAN models may perform equivalently, they generate high-
quality images differently. This suggests the existence and
uniqueness of GAN fingerprints. We define the model fin-
gerprint per GAN instance as a reference vector, such that
it consistently interacts with all its generated images. In a
specifically designed case, the model fingerprint can be an
RGB image the same size as its generated images. See Sec-
tion 3.3.
Image fingerprint. GAN-generated images are the out-
comes of a large number of fixed filtering and non-linear
processes, which generate common and stable patterns
within the same GAN instances but are distinct across dif-
ferent GAN instances. That suggests the existence of image
fingerprints and attributability towards their GAN sources.
We introduce the fingerprint per image as a feature vector
encoded from that image. In a specifically designed case,
an image fingerprint can be an RGB image the same size as
the original image. See Section 3.3.
3.1. Attribution network
Similar to the authorship attribution task in natural lan-
guage processing [56, 8], we train an attribution classifier
that can predict the source of an image: real or from a GAN
model.
We approach this using a deep convolutional neural net-
work supervised by image-source pairs {(I, y)} where I ∼
I is sampled from an image set and y ∈ Y is the source
ground truth belonging to a finite set. That set is com-
posed of pre-trained GAN instances plus the real world.
Figure 2(a) depicts an overview of our attribution network.
We implicitly represent image fingerprints as the final
classifier features (the 1 × 1 × 512 tensor before the fi-
nal fully connected layer) and represent GAN model fin-
gerprints as the corresponding classifier parameters (the
1×1×512 weight tensor of the final fully connected layer).
Why is it necessary to use such an external classifier
when GAN training already provides a discriminator? The
discriminator learns a hyperplane in its own embedding
space to distinguish generated images from real ones. Dif-
ferent embedding spaces are not aligned. In contrast, the
proposed classifier necessarily learns a unified embedding
space to distinguish generated images from different GAN
instances or from real images.
Note that our motivation to investigate “white-box”
GANs subject to known parameters is to validate the at-
tributability along different GAN parameter dimensions. In
practice, our method also applies to “black-box” GAN API
services. The only required supervision is the source label
of an image. We can simply query different services, collect
their generated images, and label them by service indices.
Our classifier would test image authenticity by predicting if
an image is sampled from the desired service. We also test
service authenticity by checking if most of their generated
images have the desired source prediction.
3.2. Component analysis networks
In order to analyze which image components contain fin-
gerprints, we propose three variants of the network.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2. Different attribution network architectures. Tensor rep-
resentation is specified by two spatial dimensions followed by the
number of channels. The network is trained to minimize cross-
entropy classification loss. (a) Attribution network. (b) Pre-
downsampling network example that downsamples input image to
8× 8 before convolution. (c) Pre-downsampling residual network
example that extracts the residual component between 16×16 and
8×8 resolutions. (d) Post-pooling network example that starts av-
erage pooling at 64× 64 resolution.
Pre-downsampling network. We propose to test whether
fingerprints and attribution can be derived from different
frequency bands. We investigate attribution performance
w.r.t. downsampling factor. Figure 2(b) shows an architec-
ture example that extracts low-frequency bands. We replace
the trainable convolution layers with our Gaussian down-
sampling layers from the input end and systematically con-
trol at which resolution we stop such replacement.
Pre-downsampling residual network. Complementary
to extracting low-frequency bands, Figure 2(c) shows an ar-
chitecture example that extracts a residual high-frequency
band between one resolution and its factor-2 downsampled
resolution. It is reminiscent of a Laplacian Pyramid [20].
We systematically vary the resolution at which we extract
such residual.
Post-pooling network. We propose to test whether fin-
gerprints and attribution can be derived locally based on
patch statistics. We investigate attribution performance
w.r.t. patch size. Figure 2(d) shows an architecture example.
Inspired by PatchGAN [36], we regard a “pixel” in a neural
tensor as the feature representation of a local image patch
covered by the receptive field of that “pixel”. Therefore,
post-pooling operations count for patch-based neural statis-
tics. Earlier post-pooling corresponds to a smaller patch
size. We systematically vary at which tensor resolution we
start this pooling in order to switch between more local and
more global patch statistics.
3.3. Fingerprint visualization
Alternatively to our attribution network in Section 3.1
where fingerprints are implicitly represented in the feature
domain, we describe a model similar in spirit to Marra et
al. [45] to explicitly represent them in the image domain.
But in contrast to their hand-crafted PRNU-based represen-
tation, we modify our attribution network architecture and
Figure 3. Fingerprint visualization diagram. We train an AutoEn-
coder and GAN fingerprints end-to-end.  indicates pixel-wise
multiplication of two normalized images.
learn fingerprint images from image-source pairs ({I, y}).
We also decouple the representation of model fingerprints
from image fingerprints. Figure 3 depicts the fingerprint vi-
sualization model.
Abstractly, we learn to map from input image to its fin-
gerprint image. But without fingerprint supervision, we
choose to ground the mapping based on a reconstruction
task with an AutoEncoder. We then define the reconstruc-
tion residual as the image fingerprint. We simultaneously
learn a model fingerprint for each source (each GAN in-
stance plus the real world), such that the correlation index
between one image fingerprint and each model fingerprint
serves as softmax logit for classification.
Mathematically, given an image-source pair (I, y) where
y ∈ Y belongs to the finite set Y of GAN instances plus the
real world, we formulate a reconstruction mapping R from
I to R(I). We ground our reconstruction based on pixel-
wise L1 loss plus adversarial loss:
Lpix(I) = ||R(I)− I||1 (1)
Ladv(I) = Drec
(
R(I)
)−Drec(I)+GP(R(I), I|Drec) (2)
where Drec is an adversarially trained discriminator, and
GP(·) is the gradient penalty regularization term defined
in [32].
We then explicitly define image fingerprint F Iim as the
reconstruction residual F Iim = R(I)− I .
We further explicitly define model fingerprint F ymod as
freely trainable parameters with the same size as F Iim, such
that corr(F Iim, F
y
mod), the correlation index between F
I
im and
F ymod, is maximized over Y. This can be formulated as the
softmax logit for the cross-entropy classification loss super-
vised by the source ground truth:
Lcls(I, y) = − log corr(F
I
im, F
y
mod)∑
yˆ∈Y corr(F
I
im, F
yˆ
mod)
(3)
where corr(A,B) = Aˆ  Bˆ, Aˆ and Bˆ are the zero-mean,
unit-norm, and vectorized version of images A and B, and
 is the inner product operation.
Our final training objective is
min
R,{F y˜mod|y˜∈Y}
max
Drec
E
{(I,y)}
(λ1Lpix + λ2Ladv + λ3Lcls) (4)
(a) CelebA real data (b) ProGAN (c) SNGAN (d) CramerGAN (e) MMDGAN
Figure 4. Face samples from difference sources.
where λ1 = 20.0, λ2 = 0.1, and λ3 = 1.0 are used to
balance the order of magnitude of each loss term, which are
not sensitive to dataset and are fixed.
Note that this network variant is used to better visualize
and interpret the effectiveness of image attribution. How-
ever, it introduces extra training complexity and thus is not
used if we only focus on attribution.
4. Experiments
We discuss the experimental setup in Section 4.1. From
Section 4.2 to 4.5, we explore the four research questions
discussed in the Introduction.
4.1. Setup
Datasets . We employ CelebA human face dataset [41]
and LSUN bedroom scene dataset [63], both containing
20, 000 real-world RGB images.
GAN models. We consider four recent state-of-the-art
GAN architectures: ProGAN [38], SNGAN [46], Cramer-
GAN [14], and MMDGAN [17]. Each model is trained
from scratch with their default settings except we fix the
number of training epochs to 240 and fix the output size of
a generator to 128× 128× 3.
Baseline methods. Given real-world datasets and four
pre-trained GAN models, we compare with three baseline
classification methods: k-nearest-neighbor (kNN) on raw
pixels, Eigenface [55], and the very recent PRNU-based fin-
gerprint method from Marra et al. [45].
Evaluation. We use classification accuracy to evaluate
image attribution performance.
In addition, we use the ratio of inter-class and intra-class
Fre´chet Distance [25], denoted as FD ratio, to evaluate the
distinguishability of a feature representation across classes.
The larger the ratio, the more distinguishable the feature
representation across sources. See supplementary material
for more detail. We compare our fingerprint features to im-
age inception features [52]. The FD of inception features
is also known as FID for GAN evaluation [34]. Therefore,
the FD ratio of inception features can serve as a reference to
show how challenging it is to attribute high-quality GAN-
generated images manually or without fingerprint learning.
4.2. Existence and uniqueness: which GAN param-
eters differentiate image attribution?
We consider GAN architecture, training set, and initial-
ization seed respectively by varying one type of parameter
and keeping the other two fixed.
Different architectures. First, we leverage all the real
images to train ProGAN, SNGAN, CramerGAN, and
MMDGAN separately. For the classification task, we con-
figure training and testing sets with 5 classes: {real, Pro-
GAN, SNGAN, CramerGAN, MMDGAN}. We randomly
collect 100, 000 images from each source for classification
training and another 10, 000 images from each source for
testing. We show face samples from each source in Fig-
ure 4 and bedroom samples in the supplementary material.
Table 1 shows that we can effectively differentiate GAN-
generated images from real ones and attribute generated im-
ages to their sources, just using a regular CNN classifier.
There do exist unique fingerprints in images that differenti-
ate GAN architectures, even though it is far more challeng-
ing to attribute those images manually or through inception
features [52].
Different GAN training sets. We further narrow down
the investigation to GAN training sets. From now we only
focus on ProGAN plus real dataset. We first randomly se-
lect a base real subset containing 100, 000 images, denoted
as real subset diff 0. We then randomly select 10 other
real subsets also containing 100, 000 images, denoted as
real subset diff #i, where i ∈ {1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000,
20000, 40000, 60000, 80000, 100000} indicates the num-
ber of images that are not from the base subset. We collect
such sets of datasets to explore the relationship between at-
tribution performance and GAN training set overlaps.
For each real subset diff #i, we separately train a Pro-
GAN model and query 100, 000 images for classifier
training and another 10, 000 images for testing, labeled
as ProGAN subset diff #i. In this setup of {real, Pro-
GAN subset diff #i}, we show the performance evaluation
in Table 2. Surprisingly, we find that attribution perfor-
mance remains equally high regardless of the amount of
GAN training set overlap. Even GAN training sets that dif-
fer in just one image can lead to distinct GAN instances.
That indicates that one-image mismatch during GAN train-
ing results in a different optimization step in one iteration
Table 1. Evaluation on {real, ProGAN, SNGAN, CramerGAN,
MMDGAN}. The best performance is highlighted in bold.
CelebA LSUN
kNN 28.00 36.30
Accuracy Eigenface [55] 53.28 -
(%) PRNU [45] 86.61 67.84
Ours 99.43 98.58
FD ratio Inception [52] 2.36 5.27
Our fingerprint 454.76 226.59
Table 2. Evaluation on {real, ProGAN subset diff #i}. The best
performance is highlighted in bold.
CelebA LSUN
kNN 11.46 10.72
Accuracy Eigenface [55] 27.98 -
(%) PRNU [45] 92.28 70.55
Ours 99.50 97.66
FD ratio Inception [52] 1.08 1.64
Our fingerprint 111.41 39.96
Table 3. Evaluation on {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. The best perfor-
mance is highlighted in bold. “Our visNet” row indicates our fin-
gerprint visualization network described in Section 3.3 and evalu-
ated in Section 4.5.
CelebA LSUN
kNN 10.88 10.58
Accuracy Eigenface [55] 23.12 -
(%) PRNU [45] 89.40 69.73
Ours 99.14 97.04
Our visNet 97.07 96.58
FD ratio Inception [52] 1.10 1.29
Our fingerprint 80.28 36.48
and finally results in distinct fingerprints. That motivates
us to investigate the attribution performance among GAN
instances that were trained with identical architecture and
dataset but with different random initialization seeds.
Different initialization seeds. We next investigate the
impact of GAN training initialization on image attributabil-
ity. We train 10 ProGAN instances with the entire real
dataset and with different initialization seeds. We sam-
ple 100, 000 images for classifier training and another
10, 000 images for testing. In this setup of {real, Pro-
GAN seed v#i} where i ∈ {1, ..., 10}, we show the perfor-
mance evaluation in Table 3. We conclude that it is the dif-
ference in optimization (e.g., caused by different random-
ness) that leads to attributable fingerprints. In order to ver-
ify our experimental setup, we ran sanity checks. For exam-
ple, two identical ProGAN instances trained with the same
seed remain indistinguishable and result in random-chance
attribution performance.
Table 4. Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. down-
sampling factor on low-frequency or high-frequency components
of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. “L-f” column indicates the low-
frequency components and represents the performances from the
pre-downsampling network. “H-f” column indicates the high-
frequency components and represents the performances from the
pre-downsampling residual network.
Downsample Res- CelebA LSUN
factor olution L-f H-f L-f H-f
1 1282 99.14 99.14 97.04 97.04
2 642 98.74 98.64 96.78 96.84
4 322 95.50 98.52 91.08 96.04
8 162 87.20 92.90 83.02 91.58
16 82 67.44 78.74 63.80 80.58
32 42 26.58 48.42 28.24 54.50
Table 5. Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. patch
size on {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Pooling starts at Patch size CelebA LSUN
42 1282 99.34 97.44
82 1082 99.32 96.30
162 522 99.30 95.94
322 242 99.24 88.36
642 102 89.60 18.26
1282 32 13.42 17.10
4.3. Persistence: which image components contain
fingerprints for attribution?
We systematically explore attribution performance w.r.t.
image components in different frequency bands or with dif-
ferent patch sizes. We also investigate possible performance
bias from GAN artifacts.
Different frequencies. We investigate if band-limited im-
ages carry effective fingerprints for attribution. We sepa-
rately apply the proposed pre-downsampling network and
pre-downsampling residual network for image attribution.
Given the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, Table 4 shows
the classification accuracy w.r.t. downsampling factors.
We conclude that (1) a wider frequency band carries more
fingerprint information for image attribution, (2) the low-
frequency and high-frequency components (even at the res-
olution of 8×8) individually carry effective fingerprints and
result in attribution performance better than random, and (3)
at the same resolution, high-frequency components carry
more fingerprint information than low-frequency compo-
nents.
Different local patch sizes. We also investigate if local
image patches carry effective fingerprints for attribution.
We apply the post-pooling network for image attribution.
Given the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, Table 5 shows
the classification accuracy w.r.t. patch sizes. We conclude
that for CelebA face dataset a patch of size 24×24 or larger
carries sufficient fingerprint information for image attribu-
tion without deterioration; for LSUN, a patch of size 52×52
(a) Non-selected samples (b) Selected samples
Figure 5. Visual comparisons between (a) arbitrary face samples
and (b) selected samples with top 10% Perceptual Similarity [66]
to CelebA real dataset. We notice the selected samples have higher
quality and fewer artifacts. They are also more similar to each
other, which challenge more on attribution.
Table 6. Evaluation on the 10% selected images of {real, Pro-
GAN seed v#i}. The best performance is highlighted in bold.
CelebA LSUN
kNN 11.99 10.35
Accuracy Eigenface [55] 26.69 -
(%) PRNU [45] 93.50 74.49
Ours 99.93 98.16
FD ratio Inception [52] 1.04 1.22
Our fingerprint 15.63 6.27
or larger carries a sufficient fingerprint.
Artifact-free subset. Throughout our experiments, the
state-of-the-art GAN approaches are capable of generating
high-quality images – but are also generating obvious ar-
tifacts in some cases. There is a concern that attribution
might be biased by such artifacts. In order to eliminate this
concern, we use Perceptual Similariy [66] to measure the 1-
nearest-neighbor similarity between each testing generated
image and the real-world dataset, and then select the 10%
with the highest similarity for attribution. We compare face
samples between non-selected and selected sets in Figure 5
and compare bedroom samples in the supplementary mate-
rial. We notice this metric is visually effective in selecting
samples of higher quality and with fewer artifacts.
Given the setup of 10% selected {real, Pro-
GAN seed v#i}, we show the performance evaluation
in Table 6. All the FD ratio measures consistently de-
creased compared to Table 3. This indicates our selection
also moves the image distributions from different GAN
instances closer to the real dataset and consequently
closer to each other. This makes the attribution task more
challenging. Encouragingly, our classifier, pre-trained
on non-selected images, can perform equally well on the
selected high-quality images and is hence not biased by
artifacts.
4.4. Immunizability: how robust is attribution to
image perturbation attacks and how effective
are the defenses?
Attacks. We apply five types of attacks that perturb test-
ing images [48]: noise, blur, cropping, JPEG compression,
relighting, and random combination of them. The intention
is to confuse the attribution network by destroying image
fingerprints. Examples of the perturbations on face images
are shown in Figure 6. Examples on bedroom images are
shown in the supplementary material.
Noise adds i.i.d. Gaussian noise to testing images. The
Gaussian variance is randomly sampled from U [5.0, 20.0].
Blur performs Gaussian filtering on testing images with ker-
nel size randomly picked from {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. Crop-
ping crops testing images with a random offset between 5%
and 20% of the image side lengths and then resizes back to
the original. JPEG compression performs JPEG compres-
sion processing with quality factor randomly sampled from
U [10, 75]. Relighting uses SfSNet [54] to replace the cur-
rent image lighting condition with another random one from
their lighting dataset. The combination performs each at-
tack with a 50% probability in the order of relighting, crop-
ping, blur, JPEG compression, and noise.
Given perturbed images and the setup of {real, Pro-
GAN seed v#i}, we show the pre-trained classifier perfor-
mances in the “Akt” columns in Table 7 and Table 8. All
performances decrease due to attacks. In detail, the clas-
sifier completely fails to overcome noise and JPEG com-
pression attacks. It still performs better than random when
facing the other four types of attacks. The relighting at-
tack is the least effective one because it only perturbs low-
frequency image components. The barely unchanged fin-
gerprints in high-frequency components enables reasonable
attribution.
Defenses. In order to immunize our classifier against at-
tacks, we finetune the classifier under the assumption that
we know the attack category. Given perturbed images and
the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, we show the fine-
tuned classifier performance in the “Dfs” columns in Ta-
ble 7 and Table 8. It turns out that the immunized classifier
completely regains performance over blur, cropping and re-
lighting attacks, and partially regains performance over the
others. However, the recovery from combination attack is
minimal due to its highest complexity. In addition, our
method consistently outperforms the method of Marra et
al. [45] under each attack after immunization, while theirs
does not effectively benefit from such immunization.
4.5. Fingerprint visualization
Given the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, we alter-
natively apply the fingerprint visualization network (Sec-
tion 3.3) to attribute images. We show the attribution perfor-
mance in the “Our visNet” row in Table 3, which are com-
(a) No attack (b) Noise (c) Blur (d) Cropping (e) Compression (f) Relighting (g) Combination
Figure 6. Image samples for the attacks and defenses of our attribution network.
Table 7. Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. different perturbation attacks before or after immunization on CelebA {real,
ProGAN seed v#i}. The best performance is highlighted in bold.
CelebA
Noise Blur Cropping Compression Relighting Combination
Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs
PRNU [45] 57.88 63.82 27.37 42.43 9.84 10.68 26.15 44.55 86.59 87.02 19.93 21.77
Ours 9.14 93.02 49.64 97.20 46.80 98.28 8.77 88.02 94.02 98.66 19.31 72.64
Table 8. Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. different perturbation attacks before or after immunization on LSUN bedroom
{real, ProGAN seed v#i}. The best performance is highlighted in bold.
LSUN
Noise Blur Cropping Compression Relighting Combination
Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs
PRNU [45] 39.59 40.97 26.92 30.79 9.30 9.42 18.27 23.66 60.86 63.31 16.54 16.89
Ours 11.80 95.30 74.48 96.68 86.20 97.30 24.73 92.40 62.21 97.36 24.44 83.42
Figure 7. Visualization of model and image fingerprint samples.
Their pairwise interactions are shown as the confusion matrix.
parable to that of the attribution model. Figure 7 visualizes
face fingerprints. Bedroom fingerprints are shown in the
supplementary material. It turns out that image fingerprints
maximize responses only to their own model fingerprints,
which supports effective attribution. To attribute the real-
world image, it is sufficient for the fingerprint to focus only
on the eyes. To attribute the other images, the fingerprints
also consider clues from the background, which, compared
to foreground faces, is more variant and harder for GANs to
approximate realistically [2].
5. Conclusion
We have presented the first study of learning GAN fin-
gerprints towards image attribution. Our experiments show
that even a small difference in GAN training (e.g., the dif-
ference in initialization) can leave a distinct fingerprint that
commonly exists over all its generated images. That enables
fine-grained image attribution and model attribution. Fur-
ther encouragingly, fingerprints are persistent across differ-
ent frequencies and different patch sizes, and are not biased
by GAN artifacts. Even though fingerprints can be deteri-
orated by several image perturbation attacks, they are ef-
fectively immunizable by simple finetuning. Comparisons
also show that, in a variety of conditions, our learned fin-
gerprints are consistently superior to the very recent base-
line [45] for attribution, and consistently outperform incep-
tion features [52] for cross-source distinguishability.
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6. Supplementary material
A. Fre´chet Distance ratio
As described in Section 4.1 in the main paper, we use the
ratio of inter-class and intra-class Fre´chet Distance [25],
denoted as FD ratio, to evaluate the distinguishability of a
feature representation across classes. For inter-class FD cal-
culation, we first measure the FD between two feature dis-
tributions from a pair of different classes, and then average
over each possible pair. For intra-class FD calculation, we
first measure the FD between two feature distributions from
two disjoint sets of images in the same class, where we split
the class equally, and then average over each class.
Mathematically,
FD ratio =
inter-class FD
intra-class FD
(5)
inter-class FD =
1
||{(y, y˜)|y 6= y˜}||
∑
y 6=y˜
FD
({
f(Ii)|yi = y
}
,
{
f(Ij)|yj = y˜
})
(6)
intra-class FD =
1
||Y||
∑
y∈Y,{i}∩{j}=∅
FD
({
f(Ii)|yi = y
}
,
{
f(Ij)|yj = y
})
(7)
where Y is the class set for image sources and f(·) is a fea-
ture representation mapping from image domain to a feature
domain.
Then in all the tables in the main paper, we compare FD
ratio between the inception feature [52] as a baseline and
our learned features. The larger the ratio, the more dis-
tinguishable the feature representation across sources. We
also show in Figure 1 in the main paper the t-sne visualiza-
tion [43] of the two features.
B. Face samples
We show more face samples corresponding to the exper-
iments in the main paper. See Figure 8 to 21.
C. Bedroom samples
We show bedroom samples corresponding to the exper-
iments in the main paper. See Figure 22 to 36. In gen-
eral, LSUN bedroom dataset is more challenging to a GAN
model because of lack of image alignment. However, Pro-
GAN [38] still performs equally well on this dataset and
does not affect our conclusions in the main paper.
Figure 8. Face samples from CelebA real dataset [41]
Figure 9. Face samples from ProGAN [38]
Figure 10. Face samples from SNGAN [46]
Figure 11. Face samples from CramerGAN [14]
Figure 12. Face samples from MMDGAN [17]
Figure 13. Arbitrary face samples from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i} where i ∈ {1, ..., 10}.
Figure 14. Filtered face samples from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i} with the top 10% largest Perceptual Similarity [66] to real
dataset distribution.
Figure 15. Arbitrary face samples without attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 16. Arbitrary face samples with noise attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 17. Arbitrary face samples with blur attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 18. Arbitrary face samples with cropping attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 19. Arbitrary face samples with JPEG compression attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 20. Arbitrary face samples with relighting attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 21. Arbitrary face samples with the combination attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 22. Bedroom samples from LSUN real dataset [63]
Figure 23. Bedroom samples from ProGAN [38]
Figure 24. Bedroom samples from SNGAN [46]
Figure 25. Bedroom samples from CramerGAN [14]
Figure 26. Bedroom samples from MMDGAN [17]
Figure 27. Arbitrary bedroom samples from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i} where i ∈ {1, ..., 10}.
Figure 28. Filtered bedroom samples from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i} with the top 10% largest Perceptual Similarity [66] to
real dataset distribution.
Figure 29. Arbitrary bedroom samples without attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 30. Arbitrary bedroom samples with noise attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 31. Arbitrary bedroom samples with blur attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 32. Arbitrary bedroom samples with cropping attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 33. Arbitrary bedroom samples with JPEG compression attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 34. Arbitrary bedroom samples with relighting attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 35. Arbitrary bedroom samples with the combination attack from the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}.
Figure 36. Visualization of bedroom model and image fingerprint samples. Their pairwise interactions are shown as the confusion matrix.
It turns out that image fingerprints maximize responses only to their own model fingerprints, which supports effective attribution.
